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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. The

Court

of Appeals did not properly consider the

constitutionally impaired order of the Trial

Court

denying

visitation for nonpayment of child support.
2. The

Trial Court erred in termination visitation for

the sole reason of nonpayment of child support.
3. The
restoration

Trial
of

Court

erred

in

conditioning

the

and the continuation of visitation upon the

payment and compliance with support orders.
4. The Trial Court erred in using it's contempt

powers

to deny and terminate visitation.
5. The

Trial

Court erred in denying visitation by not

requiring the defendant to file a petition to modify.
6. The Trial Court erred in signing a

order

over

the

timley filed objection to said order.
7. Should

the Court of Appeals use Rule 31 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedures to preclude a written
on issues that are unique and substanical ?

opinion

4

JURISDICTION

The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals sought to be
review is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", dated August 15th,
1991.
Rule

45

and

Rule

46

of the Utah Courts of Appellate

Procedure gives the Supreme Court the right

to

review

the

above decision of the Court of Appeals.
This

petition

is

filed

according

to Rule 48 of the

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF PACTS

The petitioner filed for divorce on
December, 1981, (Record

the

31st

day

of

at # 2 ) . On the 26th day of August,

1982 the divorce was granted to become effective

after

the

3-month interlocutory period (Record at # 12-14). Petitioner
agreed

by

stipulation

to

pay

to

respondent, the sum of

$250.00 per month as child support, a sum that was equal
75%

of petitioner gross income (Record at #7-10).

to

5
On

the

September

29, 1982

petitioner

filed

for

protection under Chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
On the October 12, 1982, respondent filed

a

Order

to

Show Cause, (Record at # 20). In said Order respondent asked
the

Court to hold the petitioner in contempt. This was done

before the divorce became final and while the petitioner was
under the protection of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
After the petitioner's

bankruptcy

was

discharged

he

paid the respondent all past due child support.
On the September 27, 1982, respondent filed a Order to
Show

Cause (Record at # 40), asking the court again to find

respondent in contempt. The contempt involved
settlement

the

property

and was previously discharged in the bankruptcy.

Said O.S.C. was stricken on the 8th

day

of

December, 1983

(Record at # 47). Petitioner agreed to pay the past debt and
a

Order

conforming

to

the

agreement between parties was

signed by the court on the 7th day of February 1984

(Record

at # 53-55) .
On

the

April

20, 1984

petitioner

filed a motion to

amend the divorce decree to allow the petitioner
his

visitation

to

expand

because respondent unreasonably was denying

him reasonable visitation (Record at # 60). Said motion

was

stipulated to and the Order granting said request was signed
on the 21st of June 1984 (Record at # 65-67)
On

August

6, 1985

petitioner

filed

a Order to Show

Cause because respondent was denying him visitation with his
daughter

(Record

at

#

68). Respondent

agreed

visitation to resume and the O.S.C. was stricken.

to

allow

6
On
Cause

March

27, 1986, respondent

and Petition

74-83). In

for

these

filed

Modification

Motions

(Record

with

his

daughter, until

child support payments, and then
future

#

71 &

to

and

to

deny

his

he paid the past due
restrict

petitoners's

visitation. Judge Fishier denied respondent requests

and allowed the petitioner to
Child

at

and Orders respondent wanted the

court to hold the petitioner in contempt
visitation

a Order to Show

Support

Payment

and

file

to

pay

Petition

to

Reduce

stayed any contempt proceeding

against petitioner until a review
petitioner

a

of

the

ability

of

support is accessed. The petitioner was

paying the respondent between $200.00 and $400.00 per
when the respondent filed her O.S.C.
On

April

the

month

(Record at # 81-82).

14, 1986, petitioner

filed

counter-petition for Modification of Divorce Decree

his
(Record

at # 87-88) .
On

April

22, 1986, Judge

Sawaya

Judge Fishier in which at #2 of the
issued

signed the Order of

Judgement

states

"The

of contempt against plaintiff for his failure to pay

judgements and obligation is reserved until the hearing on a
petition by plaintiff for
divorce

which

will

modification

address

the

ability to pay said judgements."

of

the

decree

of

issue of the Plaintiff's
(Record at # 95-9)

On October 14, 1986 the petitioner attempted to proceed
with his petition to modify by filing a
Setting.

Request

for

Trial

(Record at # 101).

Commissioner

Sandra

Peular set a pre-trial settlement

for February 13, 1987. (Record at # 104)

7
Respondent resisted any settlement and filed

Objection

to Request for Trial Setting. (Record at # 105).
On

March

17, 1988

visitation

and

respondent

to

filed
allow

petitioner
a

his

Order

was

to

being

Show

visitation

denied his

Cause

to

force

with

his

daughter.

that

she

could

(Record at # 111-2) .
Respondent claimed it was
called

to

court

to

unfair

answer

petitioner was delinquent in

for
his

denying

be

visitation when

child

support

Commissioner

Peuler

payments.

(Record at # 125).
On

18, April, 1988

contempt of the
promised

to

petitioner

allow

at

petitioner

this

time

and

found

no

respondent

his visitation from now on.

(Record at # 129).
On May 6, 1988, respondent filed a Order to Show
and

Cause

requested that the plaintiff pay the full amount of her

attorney fees, begin making child support
weekly

reduction

of

the

payments

until

he

Respondent filed

is
at

a

judgement, and that plaintiff be

advised that if he does not comply he will be
jailed

with

arrested

and

willing to comply. (Record at # 135).
the

same

time

a

petition

to

deny

petitioner alternate Friday visits. (Record at # 140)
After
O.S.C. came

several
before

delays
Judge

and
Sawaya

continuances
on

respondent's

October

3, 1988.

Petitioner and his attorney were willing to stipulate to the
conditions

of the O.S.C. However Judge Sawaya made his own

motion and ordered it be heard at the end

of

his

law

and

8
motion

calender

that

day. Judge

Sawaya

then

petitioner guilty of contempt, sentenced him
day

in

found

to

served

the
30

the county jail, stayed imposition of jail sentence

for 60 days to allow the petitoner to purge the contempt

by

paying the respondent a significant amount of money. (Record
at # 170)
During

the

month

of

November of 1989 the petitioner

served his jail sentence.
On February 24, 1990 respondent filed a Order
Cause, in

this

O.S.C. respondent

visitation of petitioner until he

requested
is

not

to

the

in

Show

suspend

contempt

of

court and paying her support. (Record at # 214)
On

April

respondent's

13, 1990
O.S.C. and

the

Court canceled the hearing on

respondent

filed

a

notice

of

continuance. (Record at # 258)
On

April

24, 1990, the

petitioner

O.S.C. hearing and was told by
hearing

has

been

cancelled

the

appeared

court

clerk

at

the

that

the

and that the respondent would

have to served the petitioner with a new

O.S.C. before

she

could have her O.S.C. heard by the Judge.
On

May

21, 1990

the respondent, though her attorney,

asked Judge Sawaya to issue a bench warrant for
of

the

felt

he

did

not

with
have

a
to

petitioner knew of Judge Sawaya bias against
Ray

arrest

petitioner because he had not shown for the O . S . C .

The petitioner had not been served
therefore

the

Stoddard, a

new

O.S.C. and

attend, however,
him

and

sent

attorney that had represented him early in

9
this case, to inform Judge Sawaya that
been

petitioner

had

not

served with the O.S.C. and that the petitioner and his

attorney could be in
minutes

if

Judge

Judge

Sawaya

court

room

within

15

Sawaya wanted to hold the hearing. Judge

Sawaya

stated that he knew

issued

a

what

was

going

on

and

then

no bail bench warrant against petitioner. (Record

at #254).
When Mr. Stoddard told the petitioner of

Judge

Sawaya

actions he directed his attorney to contact Judge Sawaya and
have the warrant recalled. Only after Judge Sawaya was shown
the

docket

printout

showing

the cancelling of the O.S.C.

hearing did Judge Saway recall the warrant, however he ruled
that respondent did not have to serve the petitioner with
O.S.C. and

set

a

the hearing for June 18, 1990. (Record at #

256-9) .
On June 18, 1990
guilty

of

contempt, denied

petitioner and his
serve

39

Judge

Sawaya

found

all

daughter, sentenced

the

petitioner

contact

between

the

petitioner

the
to

days in the county jail and stayed the imposition

of the jail sentence for 30 days to allow petitioner to

pay

the respondent some money. (Record at #262).
On

July

13, 1990 Judge Sawaya signed a Order over the

timely filed objections of the petitioner, those

objections

were not frivolous nor were they filed as a delaying tactic.
(Record at #268-71).
On

July 16, 1990, petitioner filed a Affidavit of Bias

directed toward the conduct of Judge Sawaya. At the

hearing

10
later that same day petitioner informed Judge Sawaya that he
filed a Affidavit of Bias earlier and according to the Rules
of Civil Procedures he could no
Affidavit

of

Bias

were

longer

reviewed

proceed

until

the

by the presiding judge.

Judge Sawaya accepted a copy of the Affidavit but he

stated

he was not bias and then when on the review hearing. (Record
at #298)
On

August

7, 1990, Judge

Murphy

denied

petitioner

affidavit of bias. (Record at #298)
On August 13, 1990 petitioner filed a notice of
for

for

both

August 7 Order

the

July

denying

13
the

appeal

Order of Judge Sawaya and the
Affidavit

of

Bias

by

Judge

Murphy. (Record at # 316).
On October 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals vacated Judge
Sawaya Order as it relates to visitation.
On

January 9, 1991 Judge Sawaya signed a Amended Order

again denying petitioner visitation rights.
Petitioner then asked the Court of
the

January

9th

Order

and

Appeals

to

review

stay the effect of said order

until the case could be giving a fair hearing.
On February 4, 1991, the Court of

Appeals

denied

the

petitioner's request for a stay.
On

March

19, 1991, petitioner

filed

for

a

Writ of

Certiorari to this Court to review the denial of the request
for the stay.
On August 14, 1991
arguments

on

the

the

Court

of

Appeals

held

oral

appeal of this case under Rule 31 of the

Rules of Appellate Procedures.
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that her father does not love her anymore

because

it

does

not want to see her anymore, a fact alleged in petitioner
supporting

affidavit

for

stay before the Court of Appeals

and left unchallenged by respondent at the

hearing

or

any

other place.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING VISITATION FOR THE
SOLE REASON ON NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT.

It

should

be

noted at this point that respondant has

admittedly abandoned the claim that the petitioner is
in

unfit

anyway or degree except nonpayment of child support, (p.

23 lines 14-21 of Transcript of Oral Argument of August

14,

1991).
The

petitioner

contends

that although the January 9,

1991 Order appears to have the best interest of the child as
the cause for terminating
Sawaya

is

visitation, the

logic

of

Judge

clearly founded only on the non-payment of child

support. The primary premises is "Because the non-payment of
child support has been willfull..." Judge Sawaya
on

to

then

goes

deduces that it is in the best interest of the child

not to see her father again.
Judge Sawaya stated at the June 18 hearing "You make no
real effort, as I see it, to pay any money to this woman
help

support

your

to

own child. So I find you in contempt of

court. I am going to take away

your

visitation

privileges

for that." Partial transcript of hearing dated 18, 1990.
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In

Lunsford

v.

Waldrip, 493 P. 2d 789, The Washington

Court of Appeals, in a case very similar to the case at bar,
states that the trial court findings were
attempt

to

disguise

the

non-payment

payment. "We recognized that there can
reason

to

regulate

no
of

be

more

than a

child

support

good

and

sound

or deny visitation privileges, but the

order which is under review here does not

cite

any

reason

other that the failure to pay money that is due. Withholding
visitation

for

the

sole

reason

that money is unpaid and

owing is an improper exercise of Judicial discretion."
The Utah Supreme Court in Slade v. Denis, 594 P.2d
stated
be

898

"The general policy of the law is that a parent will

denied

visitation

circumstances. This

rights
court

only
is

under

reluctant

extraordinary
to

deny

all

visitation rights, unless the child's welfare is jeopardized
thereby."
The Oregon Court of Appeals in West v.
96, stated

West, 487

P.2d

"The rule that visitation may not be conditioned

upon payment of support or support may not be condition upon
cooperation in allowing visits is invoked to
Court

from

children
upon

punishing

the

of

Trial

recalcitrant parent through the

Right of visitation cannot

payment

prevent

be

made

dependant

support for children, in part because the

welfare of the children underlie the allowance of visitation
with children by the parent not having custody."
The Idaho Supreme Court in Soderburg v. Solderburq, 299
P.2d

479, stated

"It

is

only

under

extraordinary

15
circumstances
visitation

that

a

parent should be denied the right of

of a child."

This court in Smith
stated

"Modification

v.

Smith, 135

Utah

Adv. Rep. 33

of custody decree must serve the best

interest of the child" you went on to say the best
of

the

child are "promoted by having the child respect for

and love of both parents. 'Fostering the child
with

interest

a

non-custodial

relationship

has important bearing on the child's

best interest.1 Dana v. Dana, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76, 78."
The Utah Supreme Court in Rohr v. Rohr, 709
stated

"...the

paramount

concern

in

P.2d

382,

children visitation

matters is the welfare of the child."
The petitioner contends that Judge Sawaya
the

June

support, as

sole

reason

of

non-payment

conform

to

the child, Judge
any

Sawaya, who's

testimony

was

with

he

the Rhor decision of the best interest on

of

June

18

hearing

evidence

of

the

did

not

child's best
the

best

not to have visitation of parent-child. It is

interesting to read the comments of
agreed

child

Court of Appeals and told that

interest, used generalities and attitudes to show
interest

of

the transcript clearly shows. However, when his

order was vacated by the

contain

at

18 hearing that he could terminate the petitioner

visitation for the

must

believed

the

petitioner

Judge

Sawaya

when

he

that "not being able to visit

her, not being able to say that, it is very damaging to

her

as well as me." when he said "I am sure that it is." Partial
transcript

of

June 18, 1990 hearing at page 3. It is clear
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that when the bias

actions

of

Judge

Sawaya

is

view

in

of this case there can be no other conclusion that

overview

Judge Sawaya does not care about anything but punishing
petitioner, even

at

the

expense

his

the

child. Appellant

attitudes are that he does not accept Judge Sawaya

handling

of this case, since Judge Sawaya enter this case the matters
has

just

deteriorated

to

the

detriment of all involved,

partly be cause Mr. Holgrem, defendant1
he

admitted

in

the

motion

for

attorney

stay hearing before this

court, Judge Sawaya will give him all the latitude
to

knows, as

he

need

pursue the petitioner. Therefore in stead of negotiating

a solution

to

this

case, he

maintains

a

position

that

petitioner cannot perform.

THE

TRIAL

COURT ERROR IN CONDITIONING THE RESTORATION

OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON THE PAYMENT

AND

COMPLIANCE

WITH

SUPPORT ORDERS.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court of Utah in

Rohr, supra, said

,f

. . . conditioning any future modifications of

fatherfs
predicated
happening

prior

upon

compliance with support order impermissibly

father's
of

divorce

one

future

rights

predetermined

to

modification

upon

event; modification would

always be available contingent only upon material change

of

in circumstances."
Judge

Sawaya

clearly is determining future visitation

upon compliance with the payment of past due

child

support
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and

maintaining

current support payment. Sense the July 18

review hearing where Judge Sawaya allow petitioner
child

support

in

maintain

his

child

continue

to

review

installment
support

payments

petitioner

payment. Judge

petitioner

payments

make
has

Sawaya

has

knew

that

and

petitioner was current with his payment when he
restoration

to

conditioned

of visitation upon the payment of $450.00 for 4

month consecutive/ and then

if

current

the

the

$450.00

then

petitioner

does

respondent

hearing terminate visitation right. The sum

not

can
of

keep

without a
$450.00

is

more than petitioner can pay and represents more than 50% of
his income.

THE

TRIAL

COURT ERROR IN USING IT'S CONTEMPT POTHER TO

DENY AND TERMINATE VISITATION.

The petitioner has found no cases in
allowing

the

termination

of

visitation

any

jurisdiction

for contempt for

failure to pay child support.
The Washington Court recognized that

it

is

wrong

to

punish parents by denying visitation right when it stated in
Matter

of

Marriage

of

Cabalquinto, 669

custody and visitation privilege

are

not

P.2d 886, "Child
to

be

used

to

penalize or reward parents for their conduct."

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

DENYING VISITATION BY NOT

REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO FILE A PETITION TO MODIFY.

18
The
1900's

petitioner

have

contends

universally

confirmed, that

that case law as far back as

held, and

later

state

statues

visitation cannot be modified or restricted

without filing a petition to modify. (U.C.A. 30-3-5)
In the Rohr, supra, the case was brought
with

a

before

the

court

petition to modify, even in Rohr, the court did not

deny all contact between parent and child, a case

not

only

involving nonpayment of support but also visitation abuse.
The petitioner contends that the issue was not properly
before

the

court

and

in

opposition

with state statues,

therefore this order must be overturned.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN

SIGNING

A

ORDER

OVER

THE

TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS TO SAID ORDER.

The

petitioner

contends

that

Utah

Code of Judicial

Administration Rule 4-504 (2) gives the plaintiff

five

(5)

in which to object to any proposed order.
In

the

case

at bar the defendant's attorney mailed a

copy of the proposed Order On order to
plaintiff's

Show

to

the

attorney on the 3rd of July, 1990. Allowing the

statutory time for mailing and the five day
plaintiff's

Cause

response

time,

objection to proposed Order was received by the

clerk of the court on July 11, 1990
limits, plaintiff

also

filed

well

within

the

time

at the same time a notice of

hearing to hear his objections.
Judge Sawaya apparently does not believe that plaintiff

19
has a rights to object to any of defendant
or

proposed

orders

findings of fact and conclusion of law, as he signed the

July 13 order over the timely filed objections and told
petitioner

that he would not allow objection to the January

9 1991 Order and in fact punish the petitioner
the

amount

of

finding

like what I

end

by

doubling

consecutive payment needed to reinstate his

visitation rights when the petitioner
proposed

the

of
up

object

to

defendant

fact and order, stating "you may
doing."

"You

can

file

not

objections

thereafter, but it won't do you any good." Transcript of the
November 26, 1990 hearing pages 10 and 21.
The

petitioner

contends that all though these hearing

and legal process Judge Sawaya demonstrated his dislike
the

petitioner

and

urges

this

for

court to review the whole

transcript of the November 26, 1990 hearing to see just

how

out of hand and unfair a judge can be.

SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS USE RULE 31 OF UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURES TO PRECLUDE A WRITTEN OPINION
ON ISSUES THAT ARE UNIQUE AND SUBSTANTIAL ?

The

Court

of

Appeals, sua

sponte, ordered this case

heard under Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and

afterwards, upon

declined

to

of

the

Petitioner, futher

issue a written opinion. If Utah Rule is meant

for anything, it is for
where

Motion

frivolous, unsubstantiated

appeals

a written decision is unnecessary. In the case at bar

petitioner has promulgated serious constitutional issues and
on

the

issue

of

contempt

he cannot find one case in any

Western jurdisdiction allowing a cessation of visitation for
non payment of child support alone.
The petitioner contends

that

after

careful

research

there are only four Court of Appeals cases under Rule 31 and
that

those

cases

each

found

the

facts

or

issues

complicated to proceed and did not proceed under said

too
rule.

There are no other similar Rules in the other Western States
researched

with

the

exception

of

Washington. That

rule

(18.16) of Washington Rules of Appellate Procedures provides
only for a joint petition for Expedited Review.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner urges that the constitutional issues

raised

and the issues of contempt power limitations are substantial
and that the Court Of Appeals erred in not issuing a written
opinion.
Petitioner

urges

that

there is n£ authority anywhere

that all visitation and all contact may be forbidden

solely

for nonpayment of child support.
Petitioner

urges that contrary to the Court of Appeals

oral discussion there must
contempt power.

be

some

limits

on

the

civil

21
Petitioner

urges

that

the

courtfs

trail

conditioning of visitation and contact

between

order
father

of
and

his child upon payment of current and past due child support
payment is wrong and not supported by any authoriity.
Petitioner

urges

that contrary to the oral discussion

of the Court of Appeals that in order for Rohr to
meaning

the

best

interest

of

the

child

controlling criteria in limiting or denying
just

taking

the

consideration

or

fulfilled

the

by

best

that

the

interest
best

of

interest

have

must

be

any
the

visitation. Not
the

child

criteria

into
is

fact that the more money paid in support

payments the better it is for the child.

Respectfully submitted,

APPENDIX

RAP 18.15

RULES ON APPEAL

RT5LES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

RULE 18.15 ACCELERATED REVIEW OF
ADULT SENTENCINGS

will make the standard form of petition available to persons who
request it.
(d) Acceptance by the Court. After review by the court, each
petition for expedited review will be granted or denied. Petitions that
are denied will be reviewed as provided in the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The time limits provided in RAP 9.2, 9.5, 9.6 and 10.2 will
begin as provided by the clerk.
(e) Agreed Report of Proceedings. Within 30 days of notice
that the petition was granted, the parties must file an agreed report of
proceedings as provided in RAP 9.4. The report is limited to five pages.
(f) Briefs Allowed. Ail briefs are limited to 10 pages and two
issues. For the purpose of determining compliance with this rule,
appendices are included. The title sheet, table of contents, table of
authorities, excerpts from the clerk's papers, and copy of the court
order or memorandum decision are not included. The brief of an
appellant or petitioner must be filed with the appellate court within 15
days after the agreed report of proceedings is filed. The brief of a
respondent must be filed within 15 days after service of the brief of
appellant or petitioner. No reply brief is allowed. Content of the
briefs must comply with RAP 10.3(a), (b), and (g).
(g) Filing Brief. The original of each brief must be filed with the
appellate court in accordance with the provisions in RAP 10.4, except
those portions of the rule relating to length of brief.
(h) Sanctions for Late Filing. Failure to timely file the petition
for accelerated review, the agreed report of proceedings or the brief will
result in the case being transferred out of the expedited appeal program
and on to the regular docket. The time limits provided in RAP 9.2, 9.5,
9.6 and 10.2 will begin the next day after a party has missed an
expedited appeal deadline.
(i) Oral Argument. Oral argument will be allowed and limited to
15 minutes for each side. Parties may request to waive oral argument.
(j) Rendering of a Decision. Except in extraordinary circumstances or when a panel recommends that the opinion be published, a
decision shall be rendered within 30 days after oral argument or, if all
parties have waived oral argument, within 30 days after waiver has
been approved by the panel.
(k) Court's Authority to Accelerate Cases. The court can also
select cases for accelerated review as provided in RAP 18.12.
(/) Conformance to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Except
when inconsistent with the provisions of this rule, the Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable to cases on expedited appeal.
(m) Termination. This rule will automatically terminate 24
months from the date of adoption, unless extended by the Washington
Supreme Court.

(a) Generally. A sentence which is beyond the standard range
may be reviewed in the manner provided in the Rules for other
decisions or by accelerated review as provided in this Rule.
(b) Accelerated Review by Motion. After the notice of appeal
has been filed, any party may seek accelerated sentence review and
must do so by motion. The motion must include (1) the name of the
party filing the motion; (2) the offense; (3) the disposition of the trial
court; (4) the standard range for the offense; (5) a statement of the
disposition urged by the moving party; (6) copies of the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment and sentence; (7) an argument for the
relief sought with reference to that portion of RCW 9.94A.210(4) relied
upon by the moving party.
(c) Service on Court Reporter or Clerk. A copy of the motion
for accelerated review must be served upon the court reporter in
attendance at the sentencing, or, in the case of electronic recording,
upon the clerk of the superior court.
(d) Time for Hearing. The hearing will be conducted no later
than 28 days following filing of the record required by RCW
9.94A.210(5). The court will notify the parties of the hearing date.
(e) Motion Procedure Controls. The motion procedure, including a party's response, is governed by Title 17.
(f) Accelerated Review of Other Issues. The decision of issues
other than those relating to the sentence may be accelerated only
pursuant to Rules 18.8 and 18.12.
[Adopted effective July 1, 1984 |

RULE 18.16 EXPEDITED APPEAL REVIEW
(a) Purpose. This temporary rule provides for expedited review of
certain cases on appeal. The purpose of establishing an expedited
procedure is to reduce the time between the filing of an appeal and the
rendering of an opinion in those cases where the parties and the court
agree that the case can be handled in an accelerated manner.
(b) Application of Rule. This rule applies only to an appeal to
the Court of Appeals from a trial court decision in a civil or criminal
case. No more than two issues can be raised in an expedited appeal.
Each Division of the Court of Appeals may adopt procedures to implement the provisions of this rule.
(c) Petition for Expedited Appeal Review. Parties must jointly
petition for expedited review by filing a Petition for Expedited Review
within 15 days after the appeal is filed. Extensions of time can be
granted only by order of the court. The clerk of the appellate court
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-4703
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD D. COLEY,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.

i Case No. D 81 5126

NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant.

i Judge James S. Sawaya

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Re: Amended Order on Order to Show Cause)
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m..
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record,
Randall J. Holmgren.
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John
R. Bucher.
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion,
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in

Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its
Order on or about July 13, 1990.

On appeal, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings
of

fact

supportive

of

the

Order

denying

child-visitation.

Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court
does now make, adopt and find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That these findings are based upon the evidence presented

at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990.

The Court has

further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in
court proceedings pertaining to this matter.
2.

That Plaintiff is in arrears in his child support,

including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00.
3.

That nothing has changed since the Court previously

(i.e., September

1988) found that Defendant had the present

capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it
is more grievous than it was before.

4.

That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and

a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since
those dates.
5.

That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the

Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making
child support payments but also during a time period when the
sentence was stayed

for the purpose

of giving

Plaintiff an

opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare.
6.

That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay

child support.
7.

That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-

educated.

His prior work experience includes being a licensed

real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local
attorneys.
8.

That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has

a residence which he rents.

The residence is furnished with

furniture and other furnishings.

He has power and heat in his

residence.

The Court has observed his manner of dress and he

dresses reasonably well.
9.

That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his

daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not
paid child support.
10.

That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of

time that he has not paid child support.
11.

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff's failure to pay child support has been willful.
12.

Because the

failure to pay

child

support has been

willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support.
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff"s attitudes and
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation
from the moral norms of society.
good

or bad; some of that

A parent influences a child for

influence comes from the child's

observations of the parent's behavior.

For these reasons, the

Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child
and

that

until

Plaintiff

adopts

an

attitude,

manifest

by

appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the

Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter.

In

that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his
daughter.

As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court finds:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
stated

The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as
in

the

aforesaid

Findings

of

Fact,

is

willful

and

contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohr. 709 P.2d 382 (Utah
1985).

Based

on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court

concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff
shows to this Court that he

is concerned

about the child1 s

financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every

month for a period of four (4) consecutive months.

The Court

believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child.

If

Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without
further hearing, suspend visitation.

DATED this

// day of

19.
BY THE COURT:

€QP\
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-4703
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD D. COLEY,

]

Plaintiff,
i Case No. D 81 5126

vs.
NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya

AMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
(June 18, 1990)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21. 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m..
Defendant was represented by counsel, Randall J. Holmgren.
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, John R. Bucher.
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion,
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its

Order on or about July 13, 1990.

On appeal, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation.

On

December 11, 1990, Judge James S. Sawaya signed the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and based upon those Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law

I

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of

Defendant in the principal amount of $27,305.00.
includes

all

child

support

arrearages

This judgment

($5,500.00:

(9/30/88-

5/30/90), pre-judgment interest (10%) on said delinquent child
support ($481.03: 9/30/88-5/30/90) and all former judgments against
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant ($16,234.48: 4/30/86-1/9/89)
and the same are hereby merged herein, together with post-judgment
interest (12%) on said judgments ($5,089.49: 4/30/86-1/9/89).
2.

Plaintiff LLOYD D. COLEY is hereby ordered in contempt

of this Court and the orders of this Court and he is ordered to
serve a term of not less than 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail.
However, the jail sentence is suspended for thirty (30) days at
which time the court will review the Plaintiff's efforts in making
2

a substantial payment to Defendant for the above judgments.
3.

Plaintiff's visitation rights with the minor child,

Laura, are hereby terminated until such time as Plaintiff shows to
this Court that he is concerned about the child's financial support
and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing child support in
the amount of $250.00 per month and making a monthly reduction of
$200.00 toward the reduction of the judgments (child support,
interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every month
for a period of four (4) consecutive months.
4.

If Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments,

without making a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court
shall, without further hearing, again terminate visitation.
5.

Plaintiff is hereby restrained from having any contact

with Defendant or her daughter, Laura.
6.

This matter is continued to July 16, 1990 at 2:00 p.m.

said will be continued by the court periodically for the next six
months or a year.

3

7.

Judgment is granted against Plaintiff and in favor of

Defendant in the amount of $400.00 for attorney fees and $30.00 in
costs incurred by Defendant in bringing this proceeding before the
Court.
Date:

, 19

.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true
and correct copy of the

foregoing AMENDED ORDER Off ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE (June 18, 1990), postage prepaid, to the following, on
January 8, 1991.
Lloyd D. Coley, Pro Se
1065 Lake Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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Lloyd D. Coley,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,

Case No. 900446-CA

Nancy P. Coley,

F I L E D
(February 4, 1991)

Defendant and Appellee.
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Bench (on Law and Motion)

This matter is before the court on a Motion To Stay
Pending Review seeking a stay of a trial court's order dated
January 9, 1991 denying appellant visitation with his minor
child pending satisfaction of specified conditions. We deny
the motion. In October, 1990, this court heard argument and
issued an order on a previous motion to stay the July 13, 1990
order of the Third District Court that denied appellant
visitation with the minor child until further order of the
trial court. This court entered the following orders, dated
October 10, 1990:
1.
That those provisions of the July
13, 1990 order denying appellant
visitation and contact with the parties'
minor child are vacated, subject to the
further order of the trial court entered
pursuant to this order.
2.
That [the] case is temporarily
remanded to the trial court for entry of
an order on visitation supported by (1)
factual findings as to the welfare of the
child, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(4) (1989) and Rohr v. Rohr, 709
P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985), and (2)
provisions as to the specific acts
required of appellant to obtain an order
reinstating visitation and contact
privileges.

3.
That this court retains
jurisdiction to review any order of the
trial court entered pursuant to this
order during the pending appeal and
appellant shall not be required to file
an additional notice of appeal or payadditional filing fees.
On December 11, 1990 the trial court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the provisions of this
court's October 10, 1990 order set forth above. The findings
are based upon the evidence presented at the hearings in
September 1988 and June 1990, the trial court record and the
attitude and demeanor of appellant in court proceedings. The
findings specify the trial court's factual basis for denying
visitation and set forth the prerequisites for reestablishing
visitation. The court found that appellant is in arrears in
child support in the amount of $27,305.00. Based upon the
factual findings, the trial court concludes:
The plaintiff's conduct, in not paying
child support . . . is willful and
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr
v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985). Based
on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
court concludes that it is not in the
best interest of the minor child to have
visitation with the plaintiff until such
time as plaintiff shows to this court
that he is concerned about the child's
financial support and expresses that
concern by paying his ongoing child
support in the amount of $250 per month
and making a monthly reduction of $200
toward the reduction of the judgments
(child support, interest, and attorney
fees) and makes both payments every month
for a period of four (4) consecutive
months. The court believes that if the
plaintiff makes a serious effort to
support his child financially and
sustains that effort over a period of
time, he will thereby demonstrate
rehabilitation of the attitude and
behavior defects, identified above, that
led this court to deny plaintiff
visitation and contact with the minor

900446-CA
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child. If plaintiff thereafter fails to
make such payments, without making a
clear showing of changed circumstances,
the court shall, without further hearing,
suspend visitation.
Appellant now seeks a stay of the December, 1990 order as
supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law
entered pursuant to this court's temporary remand. The issue
before this court is whether appellant is entitled to a stay
pending appeal under the criteria set forth in Jensen v.
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under Rule
8(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted in
Jensen v. Schwendiman, a party seeking a stay must (a) make a
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of
the appeal; (b) establish that unless a stay is granted he will
suffer irreparable injury; (c) show that no substantial harm
will come to other interested parties; and (d) show that a stay
would do no harm to the public interest. Jensen, 744 P.2d at
1027.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in
amending its July order because such amendment must have been
done within ten days under Utah R. App. P. 52(b) and 59. This
argument is wholly meritless since the amendment was pursuant
to a specific remand of this court. Appellant further claims
that the amended order is not in conformity with this court's
October 1990 order or Rohr v. Rohr, disputes the factual
findings, asserts that the trial court was required to hold a
further evidentiary hearing, and apparently claims that the
finding that he has shown disrespect for the court system
inhibits appellant's constitutional right of free speech.
Appellant argues generally that this case is distinguishable
from Rohr.
Based on our review of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and appellant's arguments summarized above,
we conclude that appellant has failed to make an adequate
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits and is not
entitled to a stay on that basis. Appellant has failed to
specifically address the remaining criteria of Jensen, and we
do not address them in detail. This court recognizes that
deprivation of visitation for failure to provide financial
support is an extreme remedy requiring a trial court to conform
with the criteria set forth in Rohr v. Rohr and to balance the
potential harm to the parent/child relationship with the
potential harm to the child from the willful failure to provide

financial support. The ultimate determination of whether the
trial court in this case has satisfied those requirements is
reserved for plenary presentation and consideration of this
case. We rule, however, that appellant has failed to sat sfy
the burden of establishing his entitlement to a stay pending
appeal under the circumstances of this case, which include the
availability of a mechanism for purging contempt and
reestablishing contact and visitation. The motion for further
stay pending appeal is denied.
One additional point requires clarification. Appellant
asserts that this court held that "appellant may review
subsequent orders in these proceedings without a new notice of
appeals or additional filing fees." The October 10, 1990 order
provided only that this court retained jurisdiction to review
orders entered pursuant to the temporary remand. Appellant is,
accordingly, not required to file a notice of appeal or
additional filing fee to obtain review of the December, 1990
order entered pursuant to remand. Any subsequent appeals of
unrelated orders, including judgments for arrearages or
contempt, are subject to all appellate rules and requirements.
ALL CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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1/ LLOYD D. COLEY, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I DELIVER A
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE OFFICE OF:

RANDALL HOLGREM
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DATED THIS

DAY OF

1991.
LLOYD D. COLEY

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Lloyd D. Coley,
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^WfyT.Noonan
Ckj^oft ft* Court

ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

900446-Otafeft^ClAppMte

v.
Nancy P. Coley,
Defendant and Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme (Rule 31)

This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App.
31
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the trial
court, contained in the Amended Order on Order to Show Cause
entered on January 9, 1991 and based upon findings of fact and
conclusions of law entered on December 11, 1990, is affirmed,
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on the appellant's
petition for modification of divorce decree filed April 14,
1986, insofar as it seeks a reduction in child support, shall
be scheduled at the earliest available date, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that,pending disposition by the
trial court of the request to modify child support, all orders
of the trial court pertaining to visitation and child support
shall remain in full force and effect and, in particular,
appellant's obligation to pay child support in the amounts and
on the schedule set forth by the trial court shall not be
altered or suspended by this order.
DATED this

day of August, 1991.

ALL CONCUR:
$ * & ! • &

J M i t h M. Billings,
Associate Presiding J
C?*-n^£St

Pamela T. Gree

> ^ <

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of August, 1991, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the party listed below:
Lloyd D. Coley
1065 Lake Street
Salt Lake City, UT

84105

Randall J, Holmsgren
Attorney for Appellee
50 West Broadway, Suite 1111
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Dated this 15th day of August, 1991.

Deputy /Clerk

